The objective test

You can’t tell what the parties under a contract are obliged to do unless you know what the terms of the contract say. So it’s pretty crucial that you learn how to determine what the terms of the contract are. But, unfortunately, this is a subject which isn’t dealt with at well by any of the contract law textbooks. Their chapters on ‘The Terms of a Contract’ are far more concerned with explaining how the terms of a contract are to be classified; something which need not concern us at the moment. The prior issue of how you tell what the terms of a contract are is usually only touched on very lightly and discussed at a very superficial level. Hence the necessity for this essay.

Now, of course, you’ll never need to determine what the terms of a contract are if both parties are in agreement as to what the terms are. If they are both agreed then there is no issue between them to be settled. The question – What are the terms of this contract? – only comes up if the parties disagree as to what the terms are. Now I want to distinguish this kind of disagreement from the case where the parties agree what the terms are but disagree over how they should be interpreted. So if Farmer and Butcher reach an agreement under which Farmer undertakes to sell Butcher 10 tonnes of ‘good quality’ British beef and Butcher agrees to pay him £5,000 for said beef on delivery, Farmer and Butcher will basically agree as to what the terms of the contract are but they might not agree on what meaning should be given to the term ‘good quality’ – Butcher might have higher standards in this regard than Farmer. And Farmer and Butcher may end up asking the courts to rule on whether the beef supplied by Farmer to Butcher was of ‘good quality’. I’m concerned in this note with much more fundamental disagreements: cases where A and B cannot even agree as to what the terms of their contract say. Some examples:

(1) Lazy types a letter to Gardener saying that he will give him ‘£100’ if Gardener mows Lazy’s lawn. Lazy meant to type ‘£10’ but pressed the ‘0’ key once too often. Gardener went round to Lazy’s house and mowed Lazy’s lawn. Gardener contends that under the terms of their contract, Lazy has to pay him £100 for the work he did; Lazy contends that he only has to pay £10.

(2) Industrious goes door to door offering to clean people’s windows for them. He goes round to 65 Mill Road and knocks on the door. Happy opens the door and Industrious says ‘Can I clean your windows? I’ll do a good job for £50.’ Happy says, ‘Okay – £50 it is. I’m just going out but I should be back by the time you’ve finished and I’ll pay you then.’ Happy goes out and Industrious starts work. By the time he comes back, Industrious has finished cleaning all the windows at 65 Mill Road. Industrious asks Happy for £50 but Happy replies, ‘Why should I give you £50? You haven’t even started cleaning my windows.’ It turns out that Happy lives at 67 Mill Road, next door to 65 Mill Road. (Happy was in 65 Mill Road when Industrious came round because he was doing some redecorating work for his neighbour, who is on holiday.) Industrious contends that under the terms of their contract, Happy is obliged to pay him £50 for cleaning the windows at 65 Mill Road. Happy contends that he doesn’t have to pay Industrious anything: under the terms of their contract, he only undertook to pay Industrious £50 if he cleaned the windows at 67 Mill Road.

(3) Desolate places an advertisement in the paper: ‘Lost cat – black with a white nose. Responds to the name “Red”. £100 reward for anyone who returns him.’ Curious sees the advertisement and later finds Red dead by the side of the road; he had been run over. (Curious identified him by his description and a name tag around Red’s neck.) Curious returns the dead cat to Desolate and claims his £100 reward. Desolate refuses to pay Curious anything, claiming that he is only obliged to pay the reward to someone who returned Red in a safe condition. Curious claims that Desolate is obliged to pay the reward to anyone who returned Red to Desolate, whatever his condition.

(4) Professor specialises in International Law and placed the following advertisement in the paper: ‘Personal assistant wanted to work full time to assist busy academic with part-time practice in international law on the side. Some travel involved due to international nature of academic’s job.’ Graduate applied for the job and was successful. Soon after Graduate started working for Professor, Professor told her to pack her bags because they were going to Afghanistan to do some research on whether the US-led military action there involved any breaches of international law. Professor told Graduate that if she had any dependants, it might be an idea if she took out some life insurance ‘because things are still pretty dangerous out there’. Professor also told Graduate that his funding for the trip to Afghanistan was pretty limited, so they would have to share a room in the hotel he had booked for them. On hearing all this, Graduate refused to go to Afghanistan. Professor insists that Graduate is required under the terms of her contract of employment to accompany him to Afghanistan. Graduate claims that she is not.

(5) Student was in charge of arranging the drinks for her College’s Winter Ball. She contacted Merchant and Merchant agreed to supply Student with 100 bottles of champagne at £20 a bottle; the wine to be delivered on the night of the ball. Come the night of the ball, one of Merchant’s employees turned up with 100 bottles of Farmer Giles’ Natural Sparkling Wine, worth about £2 a bottle. When Student protested, she was informed that according to Merchant’s standard terms, ‘In the event that we have difficulties obtaining the wine ordered, we reserve the right to supply another brand of wine in its place, at the same price as the wine that was originally ordered.’ Merchant contends that Student is obliged to pay him £2000 for the 100 bottles of sparkling wine supplied on the night of the ball (which Student reluctantly accepted, for fear that a riot would break out if she didn’t supply any alcohol). Student contends that she is not; and further contends that Merchant committed a breach of contract when he supplied the bottles of sparkling wine instead of the champagne originally agreed on.

So – how do we determine what the terms of a contract are? The answer is – we apply what is known as the objective test for determining the terms of a contract. No one has yet come up with a definitive statement as to how the objective test works – mainly because the contract law textbooks shy away from the whole issue of how we determine what the terms of a contract are. But I think the following fairly summarises the law.

Suppose that A and B are parties to a contract and they disagree over what the terms of the contract are. Now one of them will invariably be claiming that the other is bound by a particular term and the other will be claiming that he or she isn’t. Let’s say that in the case we’re considering A is claiming that B is bound by term x (that term x imposes an obligation on her) and B is claiming that she isn’t. In order to determine whether B is bound by term x, you simply ask two questions:

(i) When B entered into the contract with A, did A think B was agreeing to term x’s being part of the contract? If the answer is ‘no’ then that’s the end of the game: B will not be bound by term x. A cannot claim that B is bound by a term if he knew that she hadn’t agreed to it when she entered into the contract with A. (This is the message of Hartog v Colin & Shields (1939).) But if the answer is ‘yes’, you ask:

(ii) Was it reasonable for A to think this? If the answer is ‘no’ then, again, B will not be bound by term x. But if the answer is ‘yes’ then B is bound by term x (unless, of course, some statutory provision makes term x unenforceable).

So going back to the cases set out above –

In case (1), Gardener is claiming that Lazy is bound by the following term: ‘Lazy will pay Gardener £100 if Gardener mows Lazy’s lawn.’ To see whether this term is part of the GardenerLazy contract, we ask first of all – when Gardener mowed Lazy’s lawn, did he think that Lazy was promising to pay him £100 for doing so? Maybe he didn’t – maybe he knew that Lazy had made a mistake in typing his letter. If so, then Lazy doesn’t have to pay Gardener £100 for mowing his lawn. (Does he even have to pay him £10? Under the contract, probably not as Lazy never offered to pay Gardener £10 for mowing the lawn. He only offered to pay Gardener £100, an offer which – we’re supposing – Gardener knew was a mistake. But Gardener may still be entitled to bring a non-contractual claim for a reasonable sum – a quantum meruit – for the work he did.) But maybe Gardener thought Lazy was being generous and genuinely did think that Lazy was promising to pay him £100 for mowing his lawn. If that is the case, we then have to ask whether it was reasonable for Gardener to think this, given all the circumstances. There seems no reason why it wouldn’t have been reasonable for Gardener to think this, and so Lazy will be bound to pay Gardener £100 for mowing Lazy’s lawn.

In case (2), Industrious is claiming that, under the terms of the contract, Happy is required to pay him £50 for washing the windows of 65 Mill Road. For this to be true, it has to be established first of all that when Industrious and Happy talked, Industrious thought Happy was promising to pay him £50 if Industrious cleaned the windows of the house Happy was in when he talked to Industrious. Presumably he did; otherwise why would Industrious have done what he did? Secondly, it has to be established that it was reasonable for Industrious to think this. And I think it is – it was reasonable for Industrious to think that when Happy agreed to pay Industrious £50 for washing Happy’s windows, Happy was referring to the windows of the house he was in when he talked to Industrious. So I would have thought that Industrious would have a good claim against Happy in case (2).

In case (3), Desolate will be bound under the terms of the contract to pay Curious the reward if Curious thought Desolate was offering to pay £100 to whoever returned Red even if Red was dead and it was reasonable for Curious to think this. Curious may find it difficult to show that it was reasonable for him to think that Desolate was offering to pay a reward for the return of his cat, even if the cat was dead. Given this, Curious probably will not have a claim against Desolate in case (3).

In case (4), Professor wants to claim that under the terms of his contract with Graduate, Graduate is required to accompany him on foreign trips even if those trips require her to put her life at risk, and that she is also required to share a room with him if he doesn’t have enough money for separate rooms. It’s highly unlikely that Professor will be able to establish this under the objective test. For one thing, it’s unlikely that Professor seriously thought Graduate was agreeing to do these kinds of thing (put her life in danger, share a room with Professor) when she took up her position with him. Even if it did, it’s highly unlikely that Graduate did anything that made it reasonable for Professor to think Graduate had agreed to do these kinds of things when she signed up to work for him. Of course, if Professor had made it clear at the interview that his job often required him to travel to war-torn countries and that he would expect his personal assistant to accompany him and that on such trips they would often have to ‘rough it’ together, then that would be different. Under the objective test, Graduate would be required – under the terms of her contract with Professor – to go with him to Afghanistan. (Unless, of course, a statutory provision intervened to make this aspect of her contract of employment unenforceable.)

Case (5) is the most complex because it involves two disputes over the terms of the contract between Student and Merchant. First of all, Merchant is claiming that – under the terms of the StudentMerchant contract – Student is required to pay him £2,000 for the sparkling wine that he supplied on the night of the ball (even though the sparkling wine was only worth £200). Under the objective test, Student will be required to pay up if, when she entered into the StudentMerchant contract, (i) Merchant got the impression that Student was agreeing to pay £20 a bottle for the champagne or whatever wine Merchant chose to substitute for the champagne and it was reasonable for Merchant to believe that Student was agreeing to do this. It’s hard to see that this could be made out if, when Student and Merchant agreed their deal, Student had no idea that there was a term in Merchant’s standard form contract allowing him to supply different wine from the wine ordered, at the same price as the original wine, and Merchant was aware that Student had no idea about the existence of this term. But if the existence of the term was brought to Student’s attention and Student said, ‘Fine – I don’t care’ then under the objective test, Student probably will be obliged to pay £2,000 for the sparkling wine supplied by Merchant. Student will have given Merchant the reasonable impression that she was happy to pay £2,000 for whatever wine Merchant supplied her – either the original champagne bargained for or, if that was hard to obtain, whatever Merchant supplied in its place. But if the term wasn’t brought to Student’s attention then Merchant almost certainly won’t be allowed to sue Student for the £2,000 he wants (though he may be allowed to bring a non-contractual claim for the value of the wine that he supplied – this sort of claim is known as a claim for a quantum valebant; a claim for as much as they (the goods) were worth). Secondly, Student is claiming that Merchant was required – under the terms of the StudentMerchant contract – to supply her with champagne and that he therefore committed a breach of contract in failing to supply her with champagne. When we apply the objective test to resolve this question, our attention to switches to Student and we ask – did Student think that Merchant was agreeing to supply her with champagne when they concluded their deal and was it reasonable for her to think that? Our answer to this question will depend on whether the clause in Merchant’s standard terms had been brought to her attention. If it was, it would not have been reasonable for Student to think that Merchant was agreeing to deliver her 100 bottles of champagne, no matter what. If it wasn’t, it seems it would have been pretty reasonable for Student to have thought that Merchant was guaranteeing to supply her with 100 bottles of champagne. So case (5) all turns on whether the term in Merchant’s standard terms – which purported to allow him to supply a different wine from the one ordered, at the original price – was brought to Student’s attention. If it was, then Merchant will be able to sue Student for £2,000 for the sparkling wine that he delivered on the night of the ball and Student won’t be able to claim that Merchant committed a breach of contract in supplying the sparkling wine. But if the clause was not brought to Student’s attention, then the whole thing switches round: Merchant won’t be able to sue Student for £2,000 for the champagne (though he may be able to bring a non-contractual quantum valebant claim against Student) and Student will be able to claim that Merchant committed a breach of contract in supplying sparkling wine on the night of the ball.

Case (5) is a very common situation, where two parties (call them, A and B) agree to deal with each other, and one of the parties (say it’s B) makes it clear (either explicitly or implicitly) that he is only willing to deal with A on his, B’s, standard terms. (When you buy something from a supermarket or buy a ticket at a railway station, you are in this kind of situation: you know when you make your purchase that the supermarket or the railway company is only willing to deal with you on its standard terms.) The rules on ascertaining the terms of a contract in this kind of situation are easy enough to state:

(1) A will be bound by all of B’s standard terms, however unreasonable, if he was supplied a copy of them and indicated with his signature that he was happy to be bound by all those terms: L’Estrange v Graucob (1934). Though it will be different if A was misled as to the effect of one of the terms before signing; in that case A will not be bound by that term: Curtis v Chemical Cleaning (1951).

(2) Where A does not specifically indicate that he is happy to be bound by all of B’s standard terms, but he does not object to his agreement with B being governed by B’s standard terms, he will be bound by all of the reasonable/non-onerous/ordinary terms in B’s standard terms and by any unreasonable/onerous/unusual terms in B’s standards terms which were drawn specifically to his attention and which he did not object to: Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking (1971); Interfoto v Stiletto Visual Programme (1988).

These rules are merely examples of the objective test for determining the terms of a contract at work. If someone presents you with a standard form contract and you look at it and sign at the bottom, you’re bound by all the terms in that standard form contract, however onerous and obscure because it’s reasonable for the other guy to think that your signature means you’re happy to be bound by all the terms in the contract. If you don’t sign but merely don’t raise an objection when the other guy indicates he wants your deal with him to be governed by his standard terms, then you’re bound by those of his standard terms that are reasonable and those unreasonable terms in his standard terms which were drawn to your attention and you didn’t object to. Why? Well, with regard to the reasonable terms, it’s reasonable enough for the other guy to think that you are happy to deal on those terms. And as regards any unreasonable terms, if they have been specifically drawn to your attention and you haven’t objected to them then it’s reasonable for him to think you’ve agreed to those terms as well. So don’t fall for the idea that cases like Thornton and Interfoto are examples of the courts intervening to protect the little guy from being oppressed by big companies inserting oppressive clauses in their standard form contracts. Thornton and Interfoto are simply examples of the objective test being applied to determine the terms of the contract in situations where one party has indicated his willingness to deal on the other party’s standard terms.

In fact, virtually all of the cases normally dealt with in the contract textbooks in their chapters on ‘Terms of the Contract’ can be seen as applications of the objective test.

For example, A buys a car from B, thinking – on the basis of things B said while A was looking at it – that B has contractually guaranteed that it is of a certain age. Is there such a warranty in the contract? It depends on whether it was reasonable to think that B was making such a guarantee – and that will depend a lot on who B is. If he’s a professional car dealer then it’s more reasonable to think that he’s guaranteeing the age of the car than if he’s a private seller, getting rid of his car to buy a new one: compare Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams (1957) (ordinary car owner sells car to dealer; held owner not bound by her representation that the car was made in 1948) with Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith Motors (1965) (sale by dealer to ordinary consumer: held that dealer was bound by his representation that the car had only done 20,000 miles).

Similarly, A rents a crane from B, as he has many times before. Each time in the past, he has signed a standard form contract which expressly states that he is to cover the cost of any repairs which the crane may need after it’s been used by A. But this time nothing is signed. The crane needs to be repaired after A’s finished with it. Is A liable for the costs of repair? Applying the objective test, he is if B thought – when A hired the crane – that he was agreeing to cover the costs of any repairs that were needed and it was reasonable for her to think that. Well, she certainly thought that he was and it was reasonable for her to think that given that A had always agreed in the past to cover the costs of repair and knew when he ordered the crane this time that B was expecting him to cover the costs of repair. This was the result reached by the Court of Appeal in British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd (1973), holding that the defendant, who had urgently hired a crane from the claimant without signing the claimant’s standard terms of hire, was bound by the term in the claimant’s standard terms requiring him to pay for any costs involved in returning the crane to the claimant on the basis that a continuous ‘course of dealing’ between the two parties on the claimant’s standard terms meant that it was reasonable for the claimant to believe that the defendant was agreeing on to hire the crane on the claimant’s standard terms even though on this occasion nothing had been signed.

Introduction to contract law

Introduction

Someone enters into a contract if he makes a binding – legally enforceable – promise to someone else. So the ‘law of contract’ tells us in what situations someone will make a binding promise to someone else, and what remedies will be available if that promise is breached. While academics refer to the area of law dealt with in this chapter as ‘contract law’ or the ‘law of contract’, it is more helpful to think of it as ‘contracts law’ or the ‘law of contracts’. This is because there are at least three different ways of making a binding promise to someone else, and therefore at least three different types of contract recognised in English law. They are as follows.

(1) Covenant

Someone enters into a covenant if he makes a promise in a deed. (A deed is a particular kind of legal document. It has to be signed and witnessed to be valid.) Promises made in deeds will automatically be binding, other things being equal. The requirements that have to be satisfied in order to make a deed are laid out in the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. A document will only amount to a deed if it makes it clear on its face that it is intended to be a deed; if it has been signed by the person making the deed or his representative, and the signature has been witnessed; and the deed has been ‘delivered’ (which simply means that the person making the deed has made clear his intention to be bound by it).

(2) Bilateral contract

A bilateral contract arises if two people enter into an agreement under which they each promise to do something for the other. Under the contract, each party is bound to do what they promised to do for the other under their agreement. For example, if you and I agree that I will mow your lawn next Saturday, and that you will pay me £50 for doing so, we will have entered into a bilateral contract – my promise to mow your lawn next Saturday will be binding on me, and your promise to pay me £50 if I do so will be binding on you. The contract is bilateral in nature because each of us is bound to do something for the other under it.

(3) Unilateral contract

A unilateral contract arises if I make a promise to you with the object of inducing you to act in a particular way. If you do so act, my promise to you will be binding on me. For example, suppose I promise to pay you £100 if you find and return to me my lost dog, Freddy. You immediately start searching for Freddy. As soon as you start searching for Freddy, my promise to pay you £100 if you find and return Freddy will be binding on me. I made that promise with the object of inducing you to search for Freddy, and my promise had the effect of inducing you to search for Freddy. So if you do find Freddy and return him to me, I will have to pay you £100. The contract that arises in this situation is unilateral in nature because only one person is bound to do something under it: me. You don’t have to search for Freddy if you don’t want to. But if you do search for Freddy, then I will have to pay you £100 if you find him and give him back to me.

Estoppel

There is no reason to suppose that the number of types of contract recognised in English law will always be fixed at three. In other words, there is no reason to suppose that there will only ever be three ways of making a binding promise to someone else under English law.

For example, American and Australian law has recognised that a promise might be binding under the law on promissory estoppel. The law on promissory estoppel applies (or at least it does in America and Australia) to make A’s promise to B binding on A if B relies on that promise in such a way that it would be unfair to allow A to break his promise.

For example, suppose that EggheadUniversity is in negotiations to buy a precious manuscript for £1m. Dives has agreed to fund the acquisition, but just before the negotiations are completed, there is a dramatic fall in the stock market and Dives loses a lot of his wealth. As a result, Dives tells Egghead that he can’t help fund the purchase. Egghead asks an old member, Croesus, to help out. Croesus reluctantly tells Egghead that he will stump up the £1m needed if no one else can be found to pay for the manuscript. No one else is willing to help fund the purchase of the manuscript, but Egghead goes ahead and contracts to buy the manuscript for £1m, thinking that Croesus will fund the purchase. Croesus then tells Egghead that he has changed his mind – he won’t be contributing a penny towards the cost of purchasing the manuscript.

Is Croesus’ promise to pay Egghead £1m binding on him? Under English law, it would seem not. The promise was not made in a deed. Croesus’ promise to pay Egghead £1m did not form part of a bilateral contract. His promise was not made as part of an agreement under which Croesus and Egghead undertook to do things for each other. And Croesus’ promise to pay Egghead £1m does not seem to have given rise to a unilateral contract either. Although Egghead relied on Croesus’ promise by contracting to buy the manuscript, Croesus did not make his promise with the object of inducing Egghead to buy the manuscript. Almost certainly, Croesus would have been overjoyed if the negotiations to buy the manuscript had fallen through: he would then have been released from his promise to pay Egghead £1m.

So Croesus’ promise to pay Egghead £1m will not be binding on him under English law. In contrast, the American and Australian courts would probably recognise that Croesus’ promise was binding on him under the law on promissory estoppel. The fact that Egghead foreseeably, reasonably and irretrievably relied on Croesus’ promise makes it unfair for Croesus’ to go back on his word, and as a result he would be bound by his promise to give Egghead £1m. It should be noted that the concept of promissory estoppel is not unknown in English law. If A promises not to enforce a debt owing to him by B, and B relies on that promise in circumstances where it would be unfair for A to go back on his word and enforce the debt, then the law on promissory estoppel may apply to prevent A from going back on his promise not to enforce the debt. Again, if A promises to grant B an interest in land belonging to A, and B relies on that promise in circumstances where it would be unfair for A to go back on his word and refuse to grant B that interest, a different kind of estoppel – what is called a ‘proprietary estoppel’ – will apply to give B a right to go to court to ask the court to compel A to give B the interest that A promised to give B. However, the English courts have yet to take the step of building on these developments and recognising the existence of estoppel contracts in cases such as Croesus’, where there was no promise to waive a debt or grant someone else an interest in land.

Should the English courts take this step? Should the mere fact that a promise has been relied upon in circumstances that make it unfair for the promisor to break his promise suffice to make the promise binding under English law? Obviously, if it would be unfair for the promisor to break his promise then there is a case for the State to intervene and force the promisor to keep his promise. Moreover, as we have seen, English law recognises that some promises – such as promises to grant someone else an interest in land, or promises to waive a debt – will be legally binding under the law on promissory and proprietary estoppel. Given this, it is hard to see why English law does not say that any kind of promise will be binding if it was been relied upon in circumstances that would make it unfair to break it.

On the other hand, if the law held that promises such as Croesus’ were legally binding, the law on when a promise will be binding extremely uncertain. How can we tell with any certainty when the courts would find that it would be ‘unfair’ for someone to break a promise that has been relied upon? On balance, it seems that the unfairness involved in allowing people like Croesus to break their promises is a price worth paying to avoid this uncertainty. The fact that promises such as Croesus’ could be made binding by the simple device of inserting them in a deed means that genuine cases of unfairness created by the English courts’ current refusal to recognise that promises such as Croesus’ are legally binding will be few and far between.

A double-edged sword

There are, of course, immense benefits in having a system of contract law. Without it, it would be very difficult to rely on the promises of anyone but one’s friends and family and therefore very difficult to plan for the future. This is particularly important in the marketplace. It would be impossible for two businesses to make any long-term deals and give effect to them if they were not legally binding.

Suppose, for example, that EggheadUniversity projects that it will need 2,500 computers a year for the next 10 years. Magic Computer plc makes computers of the type needed by EggheadUniversity. In return for getting guaranteed sales of 2,500 computers a year for 10 years, Magic Computer would be willing to sell their computers to Egghead for a special discount price of £300 a computer. There is a deal to be struck here which would benefit both parties – but if it were not legally binding, it would be impossible to make the deal and then put it into effect. Distrust would prevent the parties coming together. Magic Computer would think, ‘We can’t commit ourselves to supply Egghead with 2,500 computers a year. We’d have to take on a lot more workers, and buy a lot more parts, to manufacture the computers – and then after we manufactured the computers, Egghead could make a nonsense of our investment and hard work by refusing to pay for them and buying computers from our rivals.’ Egghead would think, ‘We can’t commit ourselves to buying 2,500 computers a year from Magic Computer. Admittedly, they’re currently available at a bargain price – but after we’d bought the first batch and designed all our systems around them, what would stop Magic Computer from jacking up the price of the next batch of computers?’ Fortunately, the projected deal between Magic Computer and Egghead would be binding – it amounts to a bilateral contract. And it is precisely the bindingness of the deal that allows Magic Computer and Egghead to enter into it and plan their affairs around it – to the benefit of both parties. (It should be clear from the foregoing that the reason why the law enforces bilateral contracts is because doing so allows parties in the marketplace to make and implement long-term deals with each other.)

There is, then, no denying the value of the English law of contract – indeed, modern life would be unimaginable without it. However, the existence of the law of contract does give rise to a range of potential problems. Chief among these is the problem of people trying to use the law of contract to take advantage of other people. For example, suppose that Sandy is driving to Greenville, where she has an important appointment. In order to get to Greenville, she has to go across BlueLake in a ferry. The only available ferry is run by Red Ferry plc. Normally, when travelling on a ferry, Sandy would have a right under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 that the ferry company take reasonable steps to see that the condition of the ferry is such that she will be reasonably safe while travelling on the ferry. Before she is allowed to go onto the ferry, Sandy is presented with a form which says, among other things: ‘I hereby waive any rights I might have that Red Ferry take care for my safety while on the ferry.’ Sandy is told that unless she signs the form she will not be allowed on the ferry. She has no real choice but to sign. Sandy subsequently breaks her leg slipping on a concealed patch of oil on the deck of the ferry. Sandy sues Red Ferry for compensation. In its defence, Red Ferry argues that Sandy is bound by her promise to waive any rights she might otherwise have had that Red Ferry take reasonable steps to ensure that she was reasonably safe on the ferry.

Here Red Ferry is trying to use the law of contract to escape its legal responsibilities to Sandy. What is the best way for the law to deal with this kind of advantage-taking? Four responses suggest themselves.

(1) Do nothing

This response is not actually as stupid as it sounds. The idea is to leave it up to the free market to eliminate Red Ferry’s advantage-taking. If enough customers become dissatisfied with the way they are being treated by Red Ferry, then another ferry company will see an opportunity to compete with the service that Red Ferry provides across BlueLake. The rival company will start running ferries across Blue Lake, advertising itself as a ‘kinder, gentler’ company than Red Ferry – one which takes care of its customers and isn’t afraid to pay compensation when it gets things wrong. At that point, Red Ferry will be faced with the choice of either smartening up its act, or losing all its customers and going bust. Either way, Red Ferry’s advantage-taking will not last.

However, this response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking suffers from a couple of problems. First of all, it involves the law’s tolerating Red Ferry’s advantage-taking for as long as it lasts, with the result that any claims made against Red Ferry by injured customers such as Sandy will be dismissed on the ground that their promises to waive their rights are binding on them. Secondly, it is too optimistic to think that Red Ferry’s treatment of its customers will allow a competitor to put it out of business. It may be that the money Red Ferry saves by treating its customers so harshly allows it to offer very cheap deals to cross Blue Lake that could not be matched by a ‘kinder, gentler’ company – and it may well be that faced with the choice, the general public would prefer to get a cheap fare from Red Ferry and take the chance of not being able to sue if they get injured than pay more to cross Blue Lake, safe in the knowledge that they will be protected if they are injured due to the fault of their ferry company.

(2) Review

This response involves examining the promise made by Sandy and declaring it not to be binding if it was ‘unfair’ or ‘unreasonable’. This response to wrongdoing is embodied by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which provides that ‘An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer by a [business] seller or supplier shall not be binding on the consumer’ (reg 8(1)) and further provide that ‘A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’ (reg 5(1)). So if it is judged that holding Sandy to her promise to waive her rights against Red Ferry would be ‘unfair’, given all the circumstances, then it will not be binding on her and Red Ferry will not be entitled to take advantage of it to escape their responsibilities to Sandy.

The problem with this response to advantage-taking is that it leaves people like Sandy in a state of uncertainty as to what their rights are. Suppose Sandy was consulting a solicitor about whether she could sue Red Ferry. The solicitor tells Sandy, ‘You would have an excellent case – but the problem is that form you signed, waiving your rights against Red Ferry. If that’s binding on you, then your case is doomed to fail.’ Sandy asks, ‘Well – is it binding on me or not?’ The solicitor replies, ‘Well, that depends on whether it would be “unfair” to hold that it is binding on you. If it would be “unfair”, then it’s not binding, and you’ll win your case. If it wouldn’t be “unfair” to hold you to your undertaking to waive your rights, then it will be binding on you, and you’ll lose.’ Losing her patience slightly, Sandy asks, ‘Well – would it be “unfair” or not?’ Sighing, the solicitor replies, ‘Well, that’s hard to tell. The courts’ general approach will be to ask – Did the form, contrary to the requirement of good faith, cause a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations between Sandy and Red Ferry to Sandy’s detriment? And in order to answer that question, they’ll look at all the circumstances of the case.’

It is immediately obvious that Sandy will have a big incentive not to carry on with her case against Red Ferry. She simply won’t have enough confidence that she will win the case to enable her to take the chance of carrying on with it, losing and having to cover Red Ferry’s legal costs (which are likely to be substantial). So whether or not the form in Sandy’s case was actually binding on her or not will be irrelevant. The mere existence of the form – and the law’s saying that the form may, in certain circumstances, be binding on Sandy – will be enough to discourage Sandy from continuing with her claim against Red Ferry. So this second form of response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking – saying that Sandy’s waiver of rights will not be binding on her if it would be “unfair” to hold her to it – sounds eminently reasonable in theory. However, in practice it provides Sandy with an utterly useless form of protection against Red Ferry’s advantage-taking.

(3) Automatic strike-out

This is a very powerful response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking. Under it, Sandy’s waiver of her rights against Red Ferry is automatically declared not to be binding on her. This response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking is embodied by s 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which provides that, ‘A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice…exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence.’ (Section 1(3) of the same Act makes it clear that it only applies to attempts to exclude or restrict ‘business liability’.)

Unlike the previous response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking, this response does not leave people like Sandy in a state of uncertainty as to what their rights are. Replay the above conversation between Sandy and her solicitor, this time factoring in the existence of s 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. This time round, the solicitor starts the conversation by telling Sandy, ‘You have an excellent case against Red Ferry – that form you signed waiving your rights against Red Ferry is no problem: it’s simply not binding under s 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.’ End of conversation.

Despite its virtues, there is one problem with this response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking. Suppose that Red Ferry was forced into making all its customers sign the form that Sandy signed because it had been swamped by a large number of claims for compensation by people who had slipped on the decks of Red Ferry’s ferries while crossing BlueLake. (Ferries are, after all, very slippery places.) Almost all of these claims had no merit (in Red Ferry’s view), but they were almost always for such small amounts that no individual claim was worth the expense of fighting. But added together, the claims amounted to a substantial expense that Red Ferry could not afford to incur. So they came up with the idea of getting all their customers to sign a form, waiving their rights that Red Ferry take care to see that they were reasonably safe while crossing Blue Lake. So whenever a claim for compensation was made against Red Ferry by a customer who had slipped on their ferry, the claim would be very easy and cheap to fight. Red Ferry could simply produce the customer’s form and his case would be dismissed on the ground that the customer’s waiver of rights was binding on him.

Section 2(1) of the 1977 Act prevents Red Ferry solving its problem with unmeritorious litigation in this way. Their forms will not work to protect them from being sued. As there seems no other way round Red Ferry’s problem, s 2(1) of the 1977 Act might eventually work to drive Red Ferry into insolvency, sunk by a tidal wave of groundless claims which it has been made powerless to resist by s 2(1). So s 2(1) may in the long run work to the detriment of all the customers who need Red Ferry’s services to cross BlueLake.

(4) Prior restraint

The fourth response to Red Ferry’s advantage-taking is to allow the government to order Red Ferry to stop making its customers waive their rights against Red Ferry if Red Ferry’s doing so is ‘unfair’ or ‘unreasonable’. This response to advantage-taking can be found in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which empowers the Director General of Fair Trading to order a business to remove a term from its contracts if he or she judges it to be ‘unfair’ under the Regulations. (If the Director General makes a mistake in applying the Regulations, the affected business can apply to the courts and ask them to set aside the Director General’s order.)

This is a superior response to advantage-taking than any we have yet considered. If Red Ferry is acting unfairly or unreasonably in requiring its customers to waive their rights, then it will be made to stop, and any customer who is injured while on one of Red Ferry’s ferries will not be in any uncertainty as to what his or her rights are because he or she will never have been made to waive them in the first place. At the same time, Red Ferry retains the liberty to require its customers to waive their rights when it would be ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’ to do so – which it may well be if Red Ferry is forced into taking such a step in order to avoid being swamped with groundless claims for compensation that threaten to tip the company into insolvency.

However, there are grounds for concern about this response to advantage-taking. It involves granting the government unprecedented powers to meddle in the running of businesses, dictating the terms on which they will be allowed to trade. This cure may well turn out to produce effects far worse than the disease it was intended to treat.

The bindingness of contracts

It is a common error to think that a promise has to be written down to be legally binding. Perhaps Sam Goldwyn, the film producer, made this mistake when he joked that, ‘A verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.’ In fact, very few promises have to be made in writing in order to be legally binding. The most notable example is a promise to convey land to someone else. This must be put down in writing (Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989) and inserted in a deed (Law of Property Act 1925, s 52(1)) to be binding.

But Goldwyn was not wholly wrong. There are cases where a promise that is supposedly binding under English law will not be worth the paper, if any, it is written on. Suppose, for example, that Liam agreed to buy a particular car on Paula’s secondhand car lot for £5,000. A couple of problems with the car needed attending to: Paula promised that she would have those fixed and that she would then deliver the car to Liam’s house. Liam promised Paula that he would give her the money for the car when she delivered it. Paula then rang Liam up a few days later to tell him she was going to sell the car to someone else, who had offered £6,000 for it. What remedies will Liam be entitled to in this situation?

Could he get the courts to order Paula to hand over the car to him, through the award of what is called an order of specific performance? This is unlikely. If the courts judge that getting Paula to pay Liam damages will adequately compensate him for the losses suffered by him as a result of Paula’s breach of contract, then they will not make an order for specific performance against Paula. If the car in question is unique or of great sentimental value, thus making it hard to put a financial value on the loss that Liam will suffer as a result of not getting the car, then damages might not be an adequate remedy and then an order of specific performance might well be available. But let’s assume the car in question is an ordinary, run-of-the-mill car and there is as a result no question of Liam being awarded an order of specific performance in this case.

So Liam can’t get specific performance, but he can sue for damages to compensate him for the losses suffered by him as a result of Paula’s breach. So how much will he be able to sue Paula for? Well, let’s assume that Liam can buy a virtually identical secondhand car for £4,500 to replace the one that Paula has failed to deliver to him. So – can we say that Liam has lost £4,500 as a result of Paula’s breach? No, we can’t. We’re overlooking the fact that Liam agreed to pay £5,000 for the car Paula was going to deliver him, and that Paula’s breach means that he no longer has to pay her that sum. So Liam has actually saved £500 as a result of Paula’s breach (the difference between the £5,000 that Liam would have had to lay out had Paula performed, and the £4,500 that Liam is now going to have to shell out to buy a car to replace the one that Paula failed to deliver to him). So Liam has suffered no loss as a result of Paula’s breach. Does that mean that Liam cannot sue Paula for anything by way of damages in this situation? Not quite. The courts will award Liam nominal damages of £5 as acknowledgment that he has been the victim of a breach of contract.

So in this situation Paula has committed an obvious and deliberate breach of contract and all she has to pay Liam as a result is £5. It is hard to avoid the impression that Paula’s binding promise to deliver the secondhand car to Liam wasn’t worth the paper, if any, it was written on. Some would see this as a good result. Liam hasn’t suffered any loss as a result of Paula’s conduct, so why should he be able to sue her? Indeed, from one point of view, it would be positively regrettable if the law did anything to encourage Paula to keep her promise to Liam. The second buyer – the one who offered Paula £6,000 for the car – obviously valued the car much more than Liam, who was only willing to pay £5,000 for it. If you take the view that resources should go to those who value them most – where you are counted as valuing a resource more than anyone else if you are ready and willing to pay more for it than anyone else – then you will take the view that it was a good thing that Paula broke her promise to Liam and gave the car to the second buyer.

Others are more disturbed at the prospect of someone’s being allowed to flout their legal obligations without any kind of effective sanction. (In any case, the view that resources should go to those who are ready and willing to pay the most for them is extremely questionable. If you had a bowl of rice and had a choice between giving it to a starving child who had no money to pay for it, and a rich man who was willing to pay a pound for it because had been suddenly seized with a desire for some Chinese food, it simply cannot be true that you should give the bowl of rice to the rich man and not the starving child.) Some effective sanction would be provided for Paula’s breach if Liam were allowed to sue her for what might be called restitutionary damages – that is, damages designed to strip Paula of some or all of the gains she made by breaching her contract with Liam. This would allow Liam to sue Paula for some or all of the £1,000 profit that she made by selling the secondhand car to the second buyer, as opposed to Liam. The courts have recently started allowing claims for restitutionary damages to be made in breach of contract cases. However, they have made it clear that such damages will not be available in cases such as Liam’s, where someone has contracted to buy goods from a seller, and then the seller has sold to someone else because he has received a better offer. (Evidently the courts also believe this sort of behaviour is to be applauded and not discouraged.)

A very effective sanction for Paula’s breach would be provided if Liam were allowed to sue her for punitive damages (otherwise known as exemplary damages) – that is, damages designed to punish Paula for cynically and deliberately breaking her contract with Liam. However, while punitive damages may be awarded against people who commit torts, the courts have always set their face against such damages being awarded against people who commit breaches of contract. It is hard to see why this is so: some breaches of contract (such as an unjustified failure to pay up on an insurance contract protecting one in the event of ill health or unemployment or losing one’s house) can be far more devastating than some torts for which punitive damages may be awarded. However, there is no prospect of the current position being reversed.

Introduction to criminal law

Introduction

The criminal law performs two primary functions. The first – what I will call the ‘core’ function – is to protect our rights by punishing those who deliberately violate them. The criminal law performs this core function when it punishes murderers, rapists and thieves. All these categories of people deliberately violate other people’s rights.  The second function  – what I will call the ‘secondary’ function – is to deter people from acting in ways that are contrary to the public interest. The criminal law performs this secondary function when it punishes polluters, drug dealers and public officials who act corruptly. None of these categories of people can be said to violate other people’s rights; but they do act in ways that are contrary to the public interest.

The language that I’ve used to describe these two functions of the criminal law might be taken to suggest that the vast majority of criminal offences are concerned with protecting our rights, and that these offences are orbited by a small number of criminal offences that are concerned to deter people from acting in an anti-social way. In fact, the opposite is true. It has been estimated that there are about 8,000 different criminal offences that may be committed in England and Wales. (That number is rapidly increasing all the time – more than 700 different criminal offences were created between 1997 and 2003.) No more than 100 of those offences are concerned with protecting our rights. I’ll call these offences ‘rights-based’ offences. All of the other criminal offences recognised in England and Wales exist to deter people from acting in ways that are contrary to the public interest. I’ll call these offences ‘public interest-based’ offences. Despite this disparity in the number of rights-based offences and public interest-based offences, almost all of the offences that a law student will study when he or she studies ‘Criminal Law’ will be rights-based in nature. He or she will spend virtually no time looking at offences that exist to deter people from acting in ways that are contrary to the public interest.

In order to establish that a defendant has committed a rights-based offence, it has to be shown that the defendant has violated someone else’s rights, and that he did so deliberately. In the language customarily used by criminal lawyers, it has to be shown that the defendant committed an actus reus (a wrongful act) with a mens rea (a wrongful mind). In contrast, in order to establish that a defendant has committed a public interest-based offence, it will always be necessary to show that the defendant acted in a way that was contrary to the public interest, but it will almost never be necessary to show that the defendant acted deliberately. For example, suppose the law said that a company that has polluted a river will only be guilty of an offence if it polluted it deliberately. Such a rule would not do anything to encourage a company to take safety precautions to ensure it did not pollute a nearby river. It would know that if it failed to take such precautions with the result that it polluted the river, it would face no criminal punishment as the pollution was not deliberate. What if the law said that a company that has polluted a river carelessly will be guilty of an offence? Such a rule would almost certainly encourage our company to take some precautions to ensure that it did not pollute the river, but it would probably do no more than the bare minimum to see that it did not pollute the river. It would bet that doing no more than the bare minimum would be enough to escape being successfully prosecuted for carelessly polluting the river. The only rule which would encourage the company to do as much as it could to avoid polluting the river would be one which said that a company that has polluted a river will be guilty of an offence if it could possibly have done something to avoid polluting the river. Under this strict liability rule, the company would know that unless it could prove that it had done everything possible to avoid polluting the river, every time it polluted the river, it would face a fine. It’s for this reason that most public interest-based offences do not require it to be shown that the defendant acted with any kind of mens rea. Instead, most public interest-based offences are strict liability in nature, holding the defendant liable unless it can be shown that the defendant did everything possible to avoid doing what the defendant did.

The meaning of intention

The most serious criminal offence recognised in English law is, of course, murder. This is a rights-based offence, protecting a person’s right that others not unjustly deprive them of their life. A will commit the offence of murder if:

(i) A’s actions cause another to die; and

(ii) when A performed those actions he had an intent to kill; and

(iii) A had no lawful justification or excuse for acting as he did.

(Note that this definition is not strictly accurate: to convict A of murder it will be enough to show that when A acted as he did, he had an intent to cause someone to suffer really serious bodily harm. However, to keep things simple this point about the law will be disregarded in the discussion below.)

So, for example, suppose that I attend a political rally carrying a gun. I intend to use the gun to kill the main speaker at the rally. A policewoman spots that I have a gun. She sidles up to me and attempts to take the gun away from me. In the ensuing struggle, the gun goes off accidentally and the policewoman is killed. Am I guilty of murder? Yes I am. Running through each of the elements that have to be made out before I can be found guilty of murder:

(i) My bringing a gun to the rally caused the policewoman to die – had I not brought the gun to the rally, she would not have died.

(ii) When I took the gun to the rally, I intended to kill the main speaker at the rally. (Note that it does not have to be shown that I intended to kill the very person who died as a result of my actions.)

(iii) I had no lawful justification or excuse for bringing the gun to the rally.

Now, let’s consider a different case. I need to raise a lot of money very urgently. I own a passenger plane that is insured for £20m. I plant a bomb on the plane just before it is due to take off. My idea is that when the bomb goes off, the plane will blow up and I will be able to collect the insurance on the plane. The bomb explodes 30 minutes after the plane took off, and all the passengers and crew on the plane are killed. Am I guilty of murder? There is no doubt that my action in planting a bomb on the plane has caused the deaths of the passengers and the crew, and there is equally no doubt that I had no justification or excuse for doing what I did. The real difficulty is in establishing that I had the mens rea for murder. When I planted the bomb, can I say that I intended to kill someone?

In principle, the answer is ‘No’. I intend to bring about a certain outcome if it is my aim or purpose to bring about that outcome. When I planted the bomb, my aim or purpose was not to kill anyone. Suppose that in the case we are considering, by some miracle no one was killed or seriously injured as a result of the plane blowing up. In such a case, would I have snapped my fingers and thought, ‘Confound it! My plans didn’t work out! The plane was blown up but no one was killed! That’s not what I wanted!’ Of course I wouldn’t have. I probably would have thought, ‘Thank goodness no one was killed. Now I can collect the insurance money on my plane with a clear conscience.’ So it was not my aim or purpose to kill anyone when I planted the bomb. It follows that, in principle, I should be acquitted of murder. When I planted the bomb I did not have an intent to kill.

However, this would not be regarded by most people as a satisfactory result. In this case, I have exhibited a callous disregard for the passengers’ and crew’s rights not to be unjustly deprived of their lives. As a result, most people would regard me as being just as bad as someone who acts with a clear intention to kill, such as an assassin. If I am just as bad as an assassin, people will think that I should be convicted of murder, just like the assassin. To achieve this result, the courts have twisted the definition of when someone can be said to have had an intent to kill. The courts say that a defendant will have had an intent to kill if: (1) he or she acted with the aim or purpose of killing someone; or (2) when he or she acted, he or she knew that it was virtually certain that someone would be killed as a result of his or her actions. Adopting this definition allows me to be convicted of murder in the case we are considering. When I planted the bomb on the plane I knew it was virtually certain that the passengers and crew on the plane would be killed as a result – so under the courts’ definition of intention I can be said to have had an intent to kill when I planted the bomb on the plane. And if I can be said to have had an intent to kill, then I am guilty of murder.

A good result? In this particular case, yes. However, while it is very common for the courts to twist legal rules – redefining their terms – in order to achieve the results that they want to achieve in particular cases, manipulating legal rules in this way is rarely a good idea in the long run. Consider whether the offence of murder has been committed in the following situation. You and I are mountaineering. We are attached by a rope. You are below me on the mountain. You lose your footing on the mountain and slip into a deep crevasse. I manage to keep my place on the mountain, but we are now stuck. The only thing stopping you from falling to your death is the rope that attaches you to me. I don’t have the strength to haul you out of the crevasse, and you cannot get any kind of footing that would allow you to climb out of the crevasse. Night is approaching and we will both freeze on the mountain if we remain where we are. In the end I decide to cut the rope that attaches you to me: it’s better that one of us (that is, you) should die than that we should both die. I cut the rope and you fall to your death. Am I guilty of murder? My cutting the rope undoubtedly caused your death. But when I cut the rope, did I intend to kill you? If we define ‘intention’ in the way it is normally defined, I did not intend to kill you. When I cut the rope it was not my aim or purpose to kill you. Had you by some miracle survived your fall, I would have been delighted. I would not have snapped my fingers and thought, ‘Confound it! I thought I’d finished you off! Now I’m going have to find some other way of getting rid of you!’ However, according to the courts’ definition of intention, I did have an intent to kill in this situation: while my aim or purpose in cutting the rope may not have been to kill you, I did know at the time I cut the rope that it was virtually certain that you would die as a result.

Would it be a good result to find me guilty of murder? Of course not. I don’t exhibit anything like the callous disregard for people’s rights to life that is shown by either the assassin or by the plane bomber in the case we were considering above. But if my actions caused your death, and I had an intent to kill you when I performed those actions, then I will be guilty of murder unless the courts recognise that I had a lawful justification or excuse for my actions. So – what sort of justification or excuse can I rely on in this situation? The most obvious one is a defence of necessity: ‘The circumstances meant that I did the right thing when I cut the rope. If I had not cut the rope, both of us would have died. By cutting the rope, I ensured that at least one of us (that is, me) survived.’

So – problem solved. We can recognise a defence of necessity in this case, and thereby ensure that I am not convicted of murder. But if we do that, what does that imply for the following case? Bob is wheeled into Dr Strange’s hospital with a rare blood condition that threatens to kill him in the next two hours. The only cure is to give Bob a complete blood transfusion, replacing all of his blood with new blood. Unfortunately, there are no blood bags available of the same blood type as Bob’s. Another patient, Eric, is in Dr Strange’s hospital. He suffers from cancer. His cancer is incurable and it is predicted he probably only have six more weeks to live. Eric’s blood type is the same as Bob’s. Dr Strange orders that Eric be sedated, and all his blood drained from his body and given to Bob. Eric dies as a result of this treatment. Is Dr Strange guilty of murder? He has the actus reus and mens rea of murder – but can he take advantage of a defence of necessity here to establish that he had a lawful justification or excuse for doing what he did? If we allow a defence of necessity in the mountaineering case set out above, it is hard to see why we would not allow one here. Why could Dr Strange not argue, ‘The circumstances meant I did the right thing when I drained Eric’s blood from his body. If I had not done that, both Bob (immediately) and Eric (eventually) would have died. By draining Eric’s blood from his body, I ensured that at least one of them (that is, Bob) survived.’

I think most people would be unhappy if Dr Strange were allowed to escape a murder charge in this situation by relying on a defence of necessity. But it would seem that we have to allow him such a defence if we allow such a defence to be raised in the mountaineering case. Of course, we only have to allow such a defence to be raised in the mountaineering case because the courts have ruled that a defendant will be held to have had an intent to kill if he acted as he did knowing that death was a virtually certain consequence of his actions. If we got rid of that rule and returned to the idea that you can only be said to intend the consequences of your actions if it was your aim or purpose to produce those consequences, then we could find that there was no murder in the mountaineering case because there was no intent to kill. However, if we find there was no intent to kill in the mountaineering case, then we would have to find there was no intent to kill and therefore no murder in the plane bomber case and in Dr Strange’s case as well. (Dr Strange could argue that it was not his aim or purpose to kill Eric when he drained Eric of his blood – had Eric by some miracle survived without his blood, he would have been delighted.)

We seem to be stuck. If we adopt a strict line on when someone can be said to have had an intent to kill, some defendants who deserve to be convicted of murder will be acquitted. If we relax the definition of when someone can be said to have had an intent to kill – and say that you will have an intent to kill if you act knowing that death is a virtually certain consequence of your actions – then you will bring within the scope of the law of murder people who do not deserve to be convicted of murder. The only way of saving them from being convicted of murder will be to provide them with defences to being charged with murder; which defences may then be taken advantage of by people who do deserve to be convicted of murder.

Is there any way out of this mess? One way would be to redefine when someone is guilty of murder and say that someone will commit the crime of murder if he acts in a way that causes another’s death and at the time he acted he exhibited a callous disregard for other people’s rights not to be unjustly deprived of their lives. Under this rule, the plane bomber and Dr Strange would be convicted of murder. Both exhibited a callous disregard for other people’s rights to life in acting as they did. In contrast, I would be acquitted of murder for cutting the rope in the mountaineering case set out above. In that case, I did not exhibit a callous disregard for your right to life in acting as I did.

Morality and the criminal law

The above discussion shows what an important role is played by considerations of morality in developing the criminal law. The perception that a particular person is just as bad as someone who is clearly guilty of murder leads the courts to reshape the rules on when someone can be found to have an intent to kill. And when those rules operate in such a way as to threaten that a defendant who does not deserve to be convicted of murder will be convicted, the courts respond to that threat by reshaping the law on when someone can be said to have had a lawful justification or excuse for acting as he did, and provide that someone with a defence.

Should considerations of morality play an even greater role in the development of the criminal law? Should the criminal law take on a third function – that of encouraging people to act morally, by punishing them for acting immorally? The Victorian philosopher John Stuart Mill thought that it should not. In his book On Liberty (published in 1859), he argued:

‘[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right…’

The modern consensus is that the criminal law should observe Mill’s ‘harm principle’, so that conduct should only be criminalised if it violates other people’s rights or if it harms the public interest. The fact that acting in a particular way is immoral does not give us sufficient reason to make it a criminal offence to act in that way. Having said that, two fairly recent cases may be interpreted as breaking with this consensus.

R v Brown

In R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, a group of sado-masochists were charged with committing offences under ss 20 and 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. (Someone will commit an offence under s 20 if he maliciously wounds or inflicts grievous bodily harm on another. Someone will commit an offence under s 47 if he commits an assault on another person that occasions actual bodily harm.) The defendants deliberately inflicted pain on each other by doing such things as driving nails into each other’s bodies; burning each other with candles; and cutting each other with knives. Each of the defendants fully consented to having these things done to them.

The House of Lords had to decide whether the defendants had committed offences under the 1861 Act in acting as they had. By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords decided that they had. Some of the judgments of the majority give the impression that they thought the defendants should be punished because they had acted immorally. Lord Templeman remarked, ‘Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is uncivilised.’ Lord Lowry argued that no exemption from the 1861 Act should be made for people who ‘wish to satisfy a perverted and depraved sexual desire.’ In contrast, Lord Mustill argued in dissent that the defendants should not be convicted. He based himself on Mill’s harm principle: ‘[Questions as to whether the activities of the members of the group were right or wrong] are questions of private morality;…the standards by which they fall to be judged are not those of the criminal law;…if these standards are to be upheld the individual must enforce them upon himself…or have them enforced against him by moral pressures exerted by whatever…community to whose ethical ideals he responds.’

A couple of arguments might be made in favour of the view that convicting the defendants in Brown did not violate Mill’s harm principle. Neither of them are convincing.

(1) Violation of rights. At first sight, it seems that the activities in Brown did not violate the rights of those who were the object of those activities. Rights can almost always be waived. For example, I have a right that you not smash up my car. But if I invite you to smash my car and you do so, you will not have violated my rights. I will have waived my right that you not smash up my car.

In a similar way, it can be argued that each of the sado-masochists in Brown waived their rights not to be physically harmed by the other sado-masochists; so whenever a particular defendant physically harmed a fellow sado-masochist, he did not violate that sado-masochist’s rights. However, this argument overlooks the fact that some rights are inalienable. They cannot be waived. It is arguable that one’s right not to be treated in a cruel and inhumane manner is one such right. If this is correct, then it can be argued that every time one of the sado-masochists in Brown was injured by a fellow sado-masochist, his rights were violated. So punishing the defendants in Brown fulfilled the criminal law’s core function – that of protecting our rights by punishing those who deliberately violate them.

The weakness in this argument is that it is not clear why one’s right not to be treated in a cruel and inhumane manner should be inalienable. Nor is it clear why the criminal law should go out of its way to protect rights that the right-holders are plainly not interested in having.

(2) The public interest. The majority in Brown placed a good deal of stress on the harm that might be done to the public interest if activities such as those that went on in Brown were allowed to continue. Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle pointed out, ‘it would appear to be good luck rather than good judgment that…prevented serious injury occurring [in this case]. Wounds can easily become septic if not properly treated, the free flow of blood from a person who is HIV positive or who has Aids can infect another…’ Underlying this statement is a concern that if someone was seriously injured as a result of engaging in sado-masochistic activities, the public would have to pick up the tab for treating his injuries on the National Health Service (NHS). It follows that engaging in sado-masochistic activities is contrary to the public interest, and in punishing those who engage in such activities, the criminal law is fulfilling its secondary function – that of deterring people from acting in ways that are contrary to the public interest.

If this argument in favour of the decision in Brown were correct, then many other activities could justifiably be criminalised. As Lord Mustill pointed out in Brown, the same argument could be used to justify criminalising homosexual relations among men, as this is the principal cause of the spread of HIV and Aids in the UK. It could also be used to justify making criminals of people who spend their spare time skateboarding or mountain-climbing or smoking cigarettes in private. In effect, if this argument in favour of criminalising the activities in Brown were accepted, the existence of the NHS in the UK would make it justifiable to deprive people of the freedom to decide what to do with their own bodies. The socialisation of heath care in the UK would have the effect of justifying the socialisation of people’s bodies. This cannot be right. The fact that the State has created a national health care system cannot be invoked by the State as a reason for taking away from people liberties that they would have enjoyed in the absence of such a health care system.

So it seems that the House of Lords’ decision in Brown did violate Mill’s harm principle. In Brown, the criminal law was used to force people to act morally – no other explanation of the case makes sense.

R v Hinks

In R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241, a 38-year-old called Karen Hinks befriended a 53-year-old man called John Dolphin. Dolphin was a naïve, trusting man of limited intelligence. Hinks became his principal carer. Dolphin had substantial savings and money inherited from his father in a building society account. From April to November 1996, Hinks and Dolphin went to Dolphin’s building society virtually every day. Dolphin would withdraw £300 each time, and then give the money to Hinks. By the end of the six months, Dolphin had given Hinks approximately £60,000.

Hinks was convicted of theft and the House of Lords upheld her conviction, by a three to two majority. The majority found that all the elements of the offence of theft were present in Hinks’ case. A defendant will commit the offence of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with an intention permanently to deprive that other of that property. It was found that when Hinks accepted Dolphin’s money, she had appropriated property belonging to Dolphin. It was further found that Hinks had acted dishonestly in accepting Dolphin’s money and that when she accepted that money, she had an intent permanently to deprive Dolphin of that money.

On the facts of Hinks, the decision to convict Hinks of theft was unobjectionable. The law grants people of limited intelligence a right that other people not take advantage of their weakness, and will set aside any gifts or transactions that are the product of a violation of that right on the ground that the gifts or transactions are ‘unconscionable’. So Dolphin had a right that Hinks not exploit his limited intelligence, and Hinks violated that right when she prevailed upon him to give her £60,000. So punishing Hinks for theft did not breach Mill’s harm principle: Hinks was straightforwardly punished for deliberately violating Dolphin’s rights.

However, the real danger of the decision in Hinks is that it opens the door to people being convicted for theft whenever they dishonestly accept a gift or act dishonestly in buying something. For example, consider the following two cases:

(1) Freddie is in love with Linda. Linda does not care for Freddie, but she does not make her true feelings clear to Freddie because he lavishes so much attention and, more importantly, so many gifts on her. On Linda’s 21st birthday, Freddie gives Linda a diamond necklace, worth £20,000.

(2) Howard walks into Bill’s antique shop where a painting is on sale for £50. Howard recognises that the painting is by Rembrandt, and is in fact worth £2m. Howard gives Bill £50 for the painting on the spot and walks out of the shop with it.

If we find that Linda’s and Howard’s conduct in these situations was ‘dishonest’ then the decision in Hinks suggests that each of them will be guilty of theft. However, neither of them has violated anyone’s rights in acting as they did. The law does not confer on Freddie a right that Linda not take advantage of his infatuation for her. The law says that in affairs of the heart, Freddie has to look after himself. If Linda makes a fool of him, then that is his look-out. Similarly, the law does not confer a right on Bill that Howard not take advantage of Bill’s ignorance of the true value of his goods to snap up a bargain for himself. If Bill ends up selling a painting to Howard for far less than it is actually worth, then that is his look-out.

So if Linda and Howard are convicted of theft in the above situations, even though they did not violate anyone’s rights, the law will in effect punish them simply for acting ‘dishonestly’. In so doing, the law will violate Mill’s harm principle, under which the mere fact that someone’s conduct is immoral (or, here, ‘dishonest’) is not enough to justify criminalising it.

Evaluating Mill’s harm principle

Of course, the fact that John Stuart Mill thought that the criminal law should not be used to force people to act morally does not establish that the criminal law should not be used in this way. Why shouldn’t the criminal law be used to force people to act morally? Three reasons can be given.

First, it is not clear what the point is of forcing someone to act morally. Let’s assume that it is immoral for Wendy to cheat on her husband by sleeping with Ethan. Threatening to punish Wendy if she sleeps with Ethan may deter her from cheating on her husband, but forcing Wendy not to cheat on her husband will not make her into a better or wiser person. Instead, it will simply make her feel cowed and resentful.

Secondly, in today’s society there is no consensus on what sort of behaviour is moral and what sort of behaviour is immoral, particularly in the areas of sexual activity and drug taking. There is not even a consensus on how to resolve disagreements over what sort of conduct is moral or immoral. Given this, the idea of using the criminal law to force people to act morally is particularly problematic. Whose view of what is moral and immoral should govern? The Church’s? The State’s?

Thirdly, criminalising behaviour that is commonly believed to be immoral may have the effect of entrenching mistaken moral beliefs. For example, in parts of the United States it was at one time thought that it was immoral for a black man and a white woman to go out with each other. Had such behaviour been criminalised in the United States, it would have been very hard to challenge this thoroughly evil belief. Indeed, the lack of examples of black men and white women going out with each other that would have been produced by criminalising such behaviour would have encouraged people to think that there was indeed something wrong, or unnatural, in black men and white women going out with each other.

In light of these arguments, it seems that Mill was right. The criminal law should not play a role in forcing people to act morally, but should instead confine itself to performing the two functions identified at the start of this chapter – that of punishing people who deliberately violate other people’s rights, and that of deterring people from acting in ways that are contrary to the public interest.

Introduction to tort law

Introduction

Ali Baba saw 40 thieves depositing some of their loot in a cave. The mouth of the cave was sealed by a door, which would only open if you said ‘Open, Sesame.’ When the forty thieves had gone away, Ali Baba went up to the door, said ‘Open Sesame’, and gained access to the cave. He took away some of the thieves’ treasure. Meanwhile, Jack sold his cow for five beans, which grew into a beanstalk that stretched all the way into the sky. Climbing the beanstalk, he arrived in a strange land occupied by a giant. Jack entered the giant’s castle and stole some of his money.

Torts are magic in the same way as Ali Baba’s ‘Open, Sesame’ and Jack’s five beans were. Torts allow you to gain access to other people’s money. Suppose Vera has suffered some kind of loss as a result of Jeffrey’s doing x. Whether Vera will be entitled to sue Jeffrey for compensation for that loss will normally depend completely on whether Jeffrey committed a tort in relation to Vera by doing x. If he didn’t, then Vera will not normally be entitled to sue Jeffrey for compensation. But if he did, then Vera will normally be entitled to sue Jeffrey (lawyers say, ‘sue Jeffrey in tort’) for enough money to compensate her for the loss that she has suffered.

What is a tort?

So what is a tort – this magic thing that allows you to gain access to other people’s money? To understand what a tort is, you first of all have to understand some quite dry points of legal terminology:

(1) Suppose that the law says that B must not beat A up and it says this in order to protect A’s interests. One shorthand way lawyers have of expressing this is to say that A has a legal right that B not beat him up. Another way lawyers have of expressing this fact about the law is to say that B owes A a legal duty not to beat him up.

(2) So saying that A has a right that B not beat him up, and saying that B owes A a duty not to beat him up, are just two different ways of saying exactly the same thing: that the law says that B must not beat A up and it says this in order to protect A’s interests. (To save words, I won’t insert the word ‘legal’ in front of either the word ‘right’ or ‘duty’ from now on – but it should be understood that it is there.)

(3) Suppose that B does beat A up. In this situation we can either say that B has violated one of A’s rights or we can say that B has breached a duty owed to A. It comes to exactly the same thing. A third way of expressing what has happened here is to say that B has committed a legal wrong in relation to A, or – more simply – that B has wronged A.

We are now in a much better position to understand what a tort is. Someone who commits a tort wrongs someone else. So B will commit a tort in relation to A if she violates one of A’s rights. To put it another, exactly equivalent, way: B will commit a tort in relation to A if she breaches a duty owed to A. (This explains something which puzzles a lot of students who read cases where a claimant has sued a defendant, arguing that the defendant committed a tort in relation to her. If you look at the cases, you’ll find that in some of them – particularly cases which involve the defendant’s beating the claimant up or imprisoning her or invading her privacy – the basis of the defendant’s liability to the claimant is said to be that he violated her rights in acting as he did. However, in other cases – particularly cases which involve the defendant’s carelessly harming the claimant or failing to save the claimant from harm – the basis of the defendant’s liability to the claimant is said to be that he breached a duty (a duty of care) owed to the claimant in acting as he did. But the difference in terminology is just that – simply a difference in terminology. In all cases, the basis of the defendant’s liability to the claimant is always the same: he wronged her.)

It follows from what has just been said that if Vera wants to sue Jeffrey in tort for compensation for the loss she has suffered as a result of Jeffrey’s doing x, she will have to show that Jeffrey’s doing x violated Vera’s rights. To put it another – and exactly equivalent way – she will have to show that Jeffrey breached a duty owed to Vera in doing x. A couple of cases help to make this point.

The case of Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] AC 587 concerned a landowner called Mr Pickles. Water flowing underneath his land would eventually find its way into reservoirs run by the Bradford Corporation, which supplied the town of Bradford with water. Pickles intercepted the water flowing underneath his land and stopped it flowing into the Bradford Corporation’s waters. It is not clear why he did this. Either he wanted to sell his land and he thought that cutting off the water flowing into the reservoirs would give the Bradford Corporation an incentive to buy his land. Or he wanted to get the Bradford Corporation to pay him a yearly fee for allowing water to flow under his land and into its reservoirs. Either way, Pickles was hardly acting in a very public-spirited way when he did what he did. Bradford Corporation sued Pickles in tort. Their claim failed. Lord Ashbourne observed, ‘[Bradford Corporation] have no case unless they can show that they are entitled to the flow of water in question…’ Now, at the time Bradford Cororation v Pickles was decided the law on water rights said that if water flows in undefined channels underneath A’s land and flows from there onto B’s land, B has no right to receive any part of that water. As the water that flowed under Pickles’ land flowed in undefined channels, Bradford Corporation had no right to receive any of the water flowing under Pickles’ land. So Pickles did not violate Bradford Corporation’s rights when he intercepting the water flowing under his land. He therefore committed no tort in relation to Bradford Corporation by acting as he did.

The case of Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 arose out of a nasty little trade dispute. A steamship called the Sam Weller was being repaired in a dock in Millwall by the Glengall Iron Company. Forty boilermakers were employed on a day to day basis to make repairs to the ironwork of the ship. These boilermakers belonged to a trade union called, very grandly, the ‘Independent Society of Boiler Makers and Iron and Steel Ship Builders’. Members of this union thought that only they should be employed to do ironwork on ships. A couple of carpenters called Flood and Taylor were also employed by the Glengall Iron Company on a day to day basis to make repairs to the woodwork of the Sam Weller. Unfortunately for them, they had been employed at some point in the past by another firm – called Mills & Knight – to do ironwork on another ship. The boilermakers who were working on the Sam Weller found out about this. Being much attached to the principle that only boilermakers should do ironwork on ships, they were outraged by this news and summoned a representative from their union – the Allen of Allen v Flood – to decide what should be done. Allen went to see the managers of the Glengall Iron Company and told them that if they did not tell Flood and Taylor at the end of the day that their services were no longer required, none of the boilermakers working on the Sam Weller would present themselves for work the next day. Allen had the managers over a barrel: they needed the services of the boilermakers to get the Sam Weller repaired. So the managers did what Allen had told them to do, and told Flood and Taylor not to bother turning up to work the next day. It is not clear why Allen acted as he did. It may be that he wanted to punish Flood and Taylor for doing ironwork on another ship. Or it may be that he wanted to make an example of Flood and Taylor so as to discourage other carpenters from doing ironwork on ships. Either way, he was hardly overflowing with the milk of human kindness the day he put Flood and Taylor out of a job.

Flood and Taylor sued Allen in tort for compensation for the losses they had suffered as a result of losing their jobs working on the Sam Weller. However, their claims failed. They could not show that Allen had violated their rights in acting as he did. He had been perfectly entitled to say to the Glengall Iron Company, ‘It’s them or us – you’ve got to choose.’ It would have been different if Flood and Taylor had had a contract with the Glengall Iron Company under which the company had undertaken to employ them until the Sam Weller was completely repaired. In that situation, Flood and Taylor would have had a right that Allen not persuade the Glengall Iron Company to breach its contract with Flood and Taylor. But Flood and Taylor were employed on a day to day basis – they had no contractual right even to be employed the next day. And as Lord Herschell observed, there is a ‘chasm’ between persuading A to breach his contract with B, and persuading A not to re-employ B at the end of his current contract with B. It would also have been different if the boilermakers in Allen v Flood had had a contract with the Glengall Iron Company under which they had undertaken to work on repairing the Sam Weller until it was completely repaired. In that case, it would have been unlawful for Allen to threaten the Glengall Iron Company that if they did not let Flood and Taylor go, the boilermakers would walk out. Flood and Taylor would, in that situation, have been able to establish that Allen violated their rights in acting as he did. We all have a right that other people not intentionally cause us loss using unlawful means to do so, and Allen would have violated that right of Flood and Taylor’s if he had used unlawful means to procure their dismissals. However, because the boilermakers in Allen v Flood were employed on a day to day basis – just like Flood and Taylor – they were perfectly entitled not to turn up to work the next day. So Allen did nothing unlawful in threatening the Glengall Iron Company that the boilermakers would not turn up for work next day if Flood and Taylor were not let go at the end of the day.

The cases of Bradford Corporation v Pickles and Allen v Flood are of huge importance because they illustrate the most important point that any student of tort law has to understand about tort law: If A has acted in some way that has resulted in B suffering some kind of loss, B will not be able to sue A in tort for compensation for that loss unless A violated B’s rights in acting as he did. It won’t matter that A was very wicked or unpleasant in acting as he did; or that A was wholly to blame for the loss suffered by B; or that some theory indicates that it would be a good idea to make A compensate B for the loss that B has suffered. None of that matters. The only thing that matters is whether A violated B’s rights in acting as he did. If he did, then B will normally be entitled to sue A in tort for compensation for the loss she has suffered. If he did not, then B will not be entitled to sue A in tort.

Liability for omissions

Another area of tort law that makes this point about tort law brutally clear is the law on liability for omissions. Suppose, for example, that I have poured myself a glass of ginger beer from out of a bottle. You are sitting nearby and spot what I have not: that there is a decomposing snail at the bottom of the bottle. You don’t warn me of this. You don’t say a word. You are interested to see what will happen next. I drink all of the ginger beer in my glass. Because I’m still thirsty, I reach for the ginger beer bottle and pour its remaining contents into my glass. The remains of the snail drop into the glass. I immediately start throwing up – whether because I’m sickened at the thought that some small parts of the snail might have been in the ginger beer that I drank, or because some small parts of snail were in the ginger beer that I drank, and they have made me ill.

Here I have suffered some physical harm from which you could have easily saved me. It wouldn’t have cost you anything to warn me that there was a decomposing snail in my ginger beer bottle and had you done so, I would have come to no harm. But if I try to sue you in tort for compensation for the injury I have suffered, my claim will fail. The reason is that I had no right that you warn me of the danger I was in. To put it another – and exactly equivalent – way, you did not owe me a duty to warn me of the danger I was in. So you did me no wrong in staying silent and allowing me to drink my ginger beer.

But why doesn’t the law say that I had a right that you save me from harm in this situation? Giving me such a right would have caused you little inconvenience and would have done me a great deal of good. So why on earth doesn’t the law say that I had a right against you in this situation that you warn me of the danger I was in? The reason why in the past the law didn’t recognise the existence of rights to be saved from harm in this sort of situation is pretty obvious. Up until the 20th century, those responsible for shaping English law took the view that, for the most part, individuals should be allowed to do what they liked so long as they did no positive harm to anyone else. This laissez-faire (French for ‘let do’) attitude was well expressed (though not endorsed) by the Victorian poet Arthur Hugh Clough in his poem The Last Decalogue:‘Though shalt not kill; but needst not strive officiously to keep alive.’

But such attitudes have long fallen out of fashion – so why does the law nowadays still say that there is no right to be saved from harm in the sort of situation set out above? A couple of reasons can be given why it still might make sense for the law to hold back from finding that you owed me a duty to take steps to warn me of the danger I was in.

First of all, if the law did recognise that you owed me a duty in this kind of situation, where would it stop in imposing duties on people to rescue others from harm? Would someone who was lying unconscious in the street have a right that passers-by call him an ambulance and wait with him until the ambulance arrived? Would someone who fell ill in a theatre have a right that a ‘doctor in the house’ give up his evening’s enjoyment to treat the patient? Would a doctor who was called at home and asked to come to treat a sick child owe that child a duty to take steps to treat her illness? Would each of us have a right that the police save us from being mugged in the street? Would a beggar in the street have a right that rich people passing him by put some money in his cap? Would starving children in Africa have a right that everyone who could afford to do so donate money to relieve their suffering? The fact is that there is no natural stopping point for the law once it embarks on the course of recognising that strangers can owe each other duties to save each other from harm. So if the law recognised that I had a right that you warn me of the danger I was in, the law as a whole would be thrown into chronic uncertainty. Nobody would know when a duty to save someone else from harm would be owed, and when it would not be.

A second reason why it might not be such a good idea for the law to recognise that I had a right that you warn me of the danger I was in from the decomposing snail is illustrated by a story told about the great American golfer, Bobby Jones. During a tournament, he accidentally touched his ball with his club, and the ball moved slightly. Nobody but Jones saw that his ball had moved. Despite this, Jones drew attention to what had happened and one stroke was added to his score. When the tournament was over – with Jones losing by one stroke – Jones was congratulated on his honesty, but he brushed the congratulations off: ‘You might as well congratulate a man for not robbing a bank.’ It was his duty to report what had happened, and – in his eyes – he deserved no credit for doing his duty. While few of us are as honest as Bobby Jones was, we all tend to think like him, and only give people credit for doing things above and beyond the call of duty. If someone merely does their duty, that is no big deal in our eyes: ‘It was his job – he was supposed to do what he did. What does he want – a medal?’

So if, in the situation we have been discussing, I had had a right that you warn me of the danger I was in and you hadwarned me of that danger, you would probably have earned no credit in my eyes. You would merely have done what the law required you to do. As a result, I would feel no obligation to do something for you to repay what you had done for me. Any connection we might have made as a result of your saving me from harm would be stifled at birth. We would probably part as we had met – strangers. The great virtue of the law on liability for omissions, as it stands at the moment, is that by holding back and not imposing a duty on you to save me from harm, it gives you the opportunity to earn credit in my eyes. If you take the opportunity, your doing so will create the potential for us to form some sort of connection and perhaps friendship. So the law appears to act quite coldly in refusing to recognise the existence of a duty to rescue in situations such as the one we have been discussing. However, by doing this, it leaves people space to create warm relationships between themselves based on gratuitous acts of kindness or helpfulness. Were the law to act more warmly and impose wide-ranging duties on us to rescue each other from harm, the consequence of its doing so might be to make the world a colder, more barren place.

Vicarious liability

Suppose that you have committed a tort in relation to me and I have suffered some kind of loss as a result. In this situation, I’ll normally be entitled to sue you in tort for compensation for the loss that I have suffered. Now – if you were an employee of Ted’s at the time you committed your tort, and you committed your tort in the course of your employment by Ted, Ted will be said to be vicariously liable for your tort, with the result that I will be entitled not only to sue you in tort for compensation for the loss I have suffered, but Ted as well. (This does not mean, of course, that I can sue recover double damages for the loss I have suffered – once from you, and once from Ted. If you fully compensate me for the loss I have suffered, then that will let Ted off the hook. Similarly, if Ted fully compensates me for the loss I have suffered – you won’t then have to compensate me for the loss I have suffered.)

So, for example, in Poland v John Parr & Sons [1927] 1 KB 236, the defendants transported a waggon piled high with bags of sugar across Liverpool. The defendants employed a carter called Arthur Hall to walk alongside the waggon to make sure no one stole a bag of sugar from the waggon as it went through the streets of Liverpool. The claimant was a 12 year old schoolboy. Being a helpful soul, he thought he would help Arthur Hall stop people stealing bags of sugar from the waggon. So he walked alongside the waggon and put a protective hand on one of the bags of sugar. Unfortunately, Hall misinterpreted the claimant’s motives, and thought the claimant was trying to steal a bag of sugar from the waggon. So Hall hit the claimant, with the result that the claimant fell to the floor and the waggon rolled over his right foot, damaging it. In hitting the claimant, Hall committed a tort – the tort of battery (unlawful touching). The claimant sued the defendants for compensation for the injuries he had suffered as a result of Hall’s battery, claiming that the defendants were vicariously liable for Hall’s tort. The claimant’s claim succeeded. It was held that Hall had been acting in the course of his employment by the defendants when he hit the claimant. Hall had been employed by the defendants to protect the bags of sugar on the waggon – and Hall had been trying to do precisely that when he hit the claimant. It didn’t matter that when Hall hit the claimant, he was trying to do his job in a completely unreasonable and unauthorised manner. Hall was still trying to do his job when he hit the claimant, and that sufficed to establish that he was acting in the course of his employment.

So – why does the law make an employer vicariously liable for a tort that was committed by his employee if that tort was committed in the course of the employee’s employment? A number of different explanations have been advanced over the years.

First, if we consider the facts of the Poland case, if Arthur Hall were the only person who could be sued for compensation by the claimant in Poland, the claimant would probably not have been able to recover very much by way of compensation for the injuries he suffered as a result of Hall’s tort. Hall simply would not have had enough money to foot the bill for the claimant’s injuries. Holding the defendants in Poland vicariously liable for Hall’s tort guaranteed that the claimant could sue someone who was worth suing for compensation for his injuries. But this explanation of why there was vicarious liability in Poland does not work. It does not explain why the courts would not have held the defendants vicariously liable for Hall’s tort if he had not been acting in the course of his employment. The need to provide the victim of Hall’s tort with someone to sue who had ‘deep pockets’ would have been just as pressing whether or not Hall’s tort happened to be committed in the course of his employment.

Secondly, some commentators have argued that holding employers vicariously liable for their employees’ torts in cases like Poland helps encourage employers to take steps to ensure that the employees do not commit torts. However, this explanation does not work. If this explanation were correct, we would expect the law to say that an employer will be vicariously liable for an employee’s tort if the employer could have possibly done something to stop that tort being committed. But the law does not say that.

Thirdly, it has become increasingly fashionable to explain the findings of vicarious liability in cases like Poland along the following lines: ‘If a business operates in a way that creates a risk that I will suffer a particular kind of loss, then it is only fair that if that risk materialises and I suffer that loss, I should be able to sue that business for compensation for that loss. After all, the business gets to keep the profits that it makes from operating in the way it does; so it should also have to bear the losses that result from its operating in the way it does. If this is right, it follows that if a business employs you to work for it, and in so doing it creates a risk that you will commit a particular kind of tort in relation to me and cause me loss, then it is only fair that if that risk materialises and you commit that tort in relation to me and I suffer loss as a result, I should be able to sue the business for compensation for the loss that I have suffered. Holding the business vicariously liable for your tort allows me to sue the business for compensation for the loss I have suffered.’

However, if this explanation were correct we would expect the law to say that an employer will be vicariously liable for an employee’s tort if the nature of the job the employee was employed to do gave him the opportunity to commit that tort. But the law does not say that. Suppose, for example, that in the Poland case, while accompanying the waggon of bags of sugar through the streets of Liverpool, Hall had seen one of his enemies standing by the side of the road. Suppose further that Hall took a bag of sugar from the waggon, threw it at his enemy, and knocked him out. Hall’s employers would not have been held vicariously liable for Hall’s tort in this situation. Hall’s tort would not have been committed in the course of his employment. He would have been engaged on a ‘frolic of his own’ in throwing the bag of sugar at his enemy. But if the explanation of the law on vicarious liability advanced in the previous paragraph were correct, we would expect Hall’s employers to be held vicariously liable for Hall’s tort in this situation. By employing Hall to escort the waggon of sugar bags through the streets of Liverpool, they created a risk that he would injure his enemy in the way he did.

Fourthly and finally, it has been argued that holding employers liable for their employees’ torts in cases such as Poland is socially beneficial. The idea is that allowing the victim of a tort to sue the tortfeasor’s employer for compensation for the losses that she has suffered via the device of vicarious liability allows those losses to be shifted onto the tortfeasor’s employer. They can then be spread throughout the community. This is done in one of two ways. Either the tortfeasor’s employer makes his customers pay just a little bit extra for his goods or services in order to cover the cost of paying compensation to the victim of the tort. Or the tortfeasor’s employer gets his insurance company (which has promised – under a liability insurance policy – to cover the employer’s legal liabilities) to cover the cost of compensating  the victim of the tort, and then the insurance company then spreads the cost of paying that compensation throughout the community by charging its customers slightly higher premiums. Either way, the law on vicarious liability works to ensure that the victim of a tort does not have to bear all the losses resulting from that tort being committed, with the result that he suffers huge disruption to his life. Instead, those losses are spread out among the community, with each of us bearing a tiny and easily borne proportion of those losses. The trouble with this explanation of the law on vicarious liability is the same problem that afflicts the first explanation that we considered above. It does not explain why employers are only held vicariously liable for torts committed by their employees if those torts were committed by their employees in the course of their employment. The need to spread the losses suffered by the victim of a tort committed by an employee remains exactly the same, whether or not that tort was committed in the course of the employee’s employment.

The truth is that none of the traditional justifications of the law on vicarious liability provide a satisfactory explanation as to why we have a law on vicarious liability in the first place. So the law on vicarious liability seems to serve no rational purpose. It does, however, serve to keep tort lawyers in business. Were it not for the law on vicarious liability, very few tort claims would be brought in English courts. This is because in almost all tort cases, the only thing that makes it worthwhile to bring a claim for compensation is the prospect that the damages will be paid by an employer, who can usually afford to foot the bill involved in meeting the claim.

The future of tort law

It is periodically suggested by some academic commentators that the law of tort be abolished, either on the ground that it serves no useful purpose or on the ground that whatever useful purposes it does serve could be better achieved through some other mechanism.

Such commentators usually view tort law in one of two ways. Some think of tort law as an off-shoot of the criminal law. According to this view, tort law helps to ensure that our rights are not violated by imposing sanctions on people who violate those rights – the relevant sanction being a liability to pay damages to the person whose rights have been violated. People who take this view of tort law propose that it should be abolished because the person who ends up paying the compensation payable to the victim of a tort will not actually usually be the person who committed the tort. Either the tortfeasor’s employer will pay, thanks to the law on vicarious liability, or the tortfeasor’s liability insurer will pay. So tort law does not actually work very well to deter people from violating other people’s rights. If, then, the function of tort law is to act as an off-shoot of the criminal law, it should be abolished on the ground that it does not actually perform that function anymore.

Other academic commentators take the view that the function of tort law is to ensure that those who deserve to be compensated for the fact that they have suffered a loss of some kind are able to gain compensation for that loss. Such commentators point out that tort law does a lousy job of fulfilling this function. First of all, tort law does a terrible job of delivering compensation to those who deserve to be compensated for some loss that they have suffered. It will protect a millionaire whose Rolls Royce has been carelessly scratched by a cyclist going to work; but it won’t do anything for a baby who has been born horribly deformed because of a defect in its genetic make-up. Tort law protects the millionaire because his rights have been violated; and it does nothing for the baby because the baby’s rights have not been violated. But if tort law’s job is to deliver compensation to those who are most deserving of it, it is difficult to understand why tort law focuses on whether someone’s rights have been violated. It is simply not the case that people whose rights have been violated are the most deserving of compensation. Secondly, tort law is an extremely expensive and inefficient vehicle for delivering compensation to people who deserve to be compensated for some loss that they have suffered. It costs a lot of time and money to determine whether a particular claimant is entitled to sue a particular defendant in tort for compensation for some loss he has suffered; it also costs a lot money for potential defendants to protect themselves against being sued in tort for compensation by taking out liability insurance policies. And – given the perils involved in bringing a claim in tort against someone else – there is no guarantee that those who qualify for compensation under the tort law rules will actually obtain that compensation. If, then, the function of tort law is to deliver compensation to those who are most deserving of it, it seems undeniable that tort law should be scrapped and replaced by a new system that will do a better job of performing that function.

However, before we rush to condemn tort law, we should first of all examine whether the premises underlying our judgment are justified. Is it true to say that the function of tort law is to act as an off-shoot of the criminal law? This seems implausible. If the function of tort law is to impose sanctions on people who violate other people’s rights, why does tort law do this by making tortfeasors pay compensation to the victims of their torts? Why doesn’t it fine tortfeasors for what they have done, with the fines being adjusted according to the degree of a tortfeasor’s fault for what he did? Alternatively, is it true to say that the function of tort law is to deliver compensation to those who are most deserving of it? Again, this seems implausible. As we have already observed, if it were the case that tort law’s job was simply to deliver compensation to those who are most deserving of it, it is hard to understand why tort law simply focusses on protecting those whose rights have been violated.

So what is the function of tort law? It is submitted that the function of tort law is to enable people to vindicate their rights in the face of those who would violate them. If A is proposing to do something that will violate B’s rights, tort law allows B to obtain an injunction, requiring A not to violate B’s rights on pain of being sent to prison if he does. If A has already done something to violate B’s rights, tort law allows B to sue A for damages designed to put her in as good a position as she would have been in had A respected her rights. Viewed in this light, the idea of abolishing tort law becomes faintly preposterous. Abolishing tort law would mean we could no longer take steps ourselves to vindicate our rights in the face of those who would violate them. We would instead become wholly dependent on the State, acting through the criminal law, to protect us from those who would violate our rights. So abolishing tort law would bring about a very significant and almost certainly unjustified transfer of power from the individual to the State.

Battle of the forms

The problem

A battle of the forms exists when two businesses want to enter into a contractual relationship, but each want the transaction to be governed by their standard terms. When such a battle is entered into, two questions arise: (1) is there a contract between the parties; and (2) if so, on what terms.

The courts have tended to assume that if, despite the battle, one party eventually rendered some kind of performance (albeit perhaps defective) to the other, the answer to (1) is always going to be ‘yes’. See, for example, the leading ‘battle of the forms’ case, Butler Machine Tool v Ex-Cell-O Corpn (1979), where a machine was offered for sale on the suppliers’ terms. The suppliers’ terms included a price variation clause allowing them to charge more if the machine turned out to be more expensive to produce. The buyers ordered the machine, with their terms and conditions attached. These terms and conditions obviously did not include a price variation clause. The suppliers sent back a tear-off slip at the bottom of the order, acknowledging that it had been received, together with a letter saying that they had pleasure in acknowledging the buyers’ order for the machine, which would be delivered in accordance with their standard terms. The machine was subsequently delivered to the buyers, but the suppliers demanded that the buyers pay more for it under the price variation clause. Lord Denning MR observed, ‘No doubt a contract was…concluded.’ For him, the only issue was issue (2) – ‘But on what terms?’

Suggested answers to question (2)

The applicable case law suggests two approaches to determining what terms governed the contract that will (the courts seem to suppose) exist between two businesses that have engaged in a battle of the forms and then gone ahead and performed.

(i) The traditional approach

The traditional approach – favoured by Lawton and Bridge LJJ in Butler Machine Tool and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol (2009) – is to see whether there is any point where one party to the battle of the forms can be said to have reasonably given the other party the impression that he (the first party) was agreeing to deal on the second party’s terms. Given the emphasis placed, under this approach, on seeing whether there is some point, at any point, where one person can be said to have reasonably given the other party the impression that he has surrendered in the battle, an alternative name for this approach for resolving a battle of the form is the ‘objective approach’.

In Butler that point was reached when the suppliers sent back the buyers’ tear-off slip. Despite the letter accompanying it, the Court of Appeal found that at that point, the suppliers had done enough reasonably to give the buyers the impression that they had agreed to deal on the buyers’ terms, which did not include a price variation clause.

In Tekdata, Longmore LJ put a case where a buyer offers to purchase goods from a seller, on the buyer’s terms. The seller acknowledges the purchase order, and encloses a copy of his, the seller’s, terms. The seller then delivers the goods, which the buyer accepts. In such a case, Longmore LJ thought that ‘other things being equal’ there would exist ‘a contract on the seller’s terms.’ The reason for this is that by accepting the goods without objection, the buyer would at that point have given the impression that he was agreeing to purchase the goods on the seller’s terms.

This last example may account for why the traditional approach to determining the terms of a contract when there has been a battle of the forms is sometimes called the ‘last shot’ approach. The seller fired the last shot before delivery by insisting when acknowledging the buyer’s order that the deal be on his, the seller’s, terms. By accepting delivery, the buyer has surrendered in the battle. However, as was acknowledged in Butler, the term ‘last shot’ is misleading as a summary of what the courts are looking for under the traditional approach. As Lord Denning MR remarked in that case, ‘In some cases the battle is won by the man who gets the blow in first. If he offers to sell at a named price on the terms and conditions stated on the back: and the buyer orders the goods purporting to accept the offer – on an order form with his own different terms and conditions on the back – then if the difference is so material that it would affect the price, the buyer ought not to be allowed to take advantage of the difference unless he draws it specifically to the attention of the seller’ (emphasis added).

(ii) Lord Denning’s approach

Lord Denning’s approach to determining what the terms of a contract are between businesses that have engaged in a battle of the forms is often presented in the contract textbooks as an alternative to the traditional, or objective, approach to resolving this question. That is one way of looking at. But an alternative is to see Lord Denning’s approach as kicking in when under the traditional, or objective, approach it is not possible to say that a contract was concluded on the terms of either business. So Lord Denning’s approach would only apply when there is no point at which we can say that one party reasonably gave the other party the impression that he was surrendering in the battle. What do we do in that case? In Butler, Lord Denning suggested that in a case where ‘There is a concluded contract but the forms vary…[t]he terms and conditions of both parties are to be construed together. If they can be reconciled to give a harmonious result, all well and good. If differences are irreconcilable – so that they are all mutually contradictory – then the conflicting terms may have to be scrapped and replaced by a reasonable implication.’ Denning never had to do this in Butler itself, as in that case he agreed with his colleagues that the suppliers had reasonably given the buyers the impression that they would deal on the buyers terms. But in a couple of cases – Lidl UK Gmbh v Hertford Foods Ltd (2001, CA) and Ghsp Inc v Ab Electronic Ltd (2010, Burton J) – the courts have found that the battle of the forms was so intractable that neither party’s standard terms could be said to apply, and that the terms of the contract were either supplied by the minimum terms that the parties did agree on (Lidl) or by the general law as represented by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (Ghsp).

My suggested solution

I think the current law just encourages businesses to engage in battles of the forms. The traditional approach encourages businesses to stand their ground in the battle in the hope that they will be able to convince a court that the other side did something at some point to give the reasonable impression that they were conceding the battle. And Lord Denning’s approach reassures the parties to a battle of the forms that even if neither side backs down (or reasonably gives the impression of backing down) they will still enjoy a great deal of protection from the law of contract, which will enable them to sue for late payment or defective performance, even if it does not allow them to take advantage of their extra special standard terms that they were wanting to get into the contract.

The only way to stop battles of the forms occurring is to follow a simple rule: If a battle of the forms breaks out, the courts will find that there was no contract between the parties unless it is clear that the parties subjectively agreed as to what the terms of their contract would be. Such a rule would wonderfully concentrate the minds of both parties to a battle of the forms. A buyer who was insisting on dealing on his standard terms would worry that if the courts found that there was no contract, he would not be able to sue for defective performance. (The law of tort does not generally allow actions for receiving – this a phrase from Tony Weir – no good goods.) A seller who was insisting on dealing on his standard terms would worry that if the courts found that there was no contract, he would be reduced to suing under the law of restitution for a reasonable sum (in Latin, quantum valebant – ‘as much as they are worth’) for any goods he delivered to the buyer. Both parties would have a substantial incentive to call a ceasefire in the battle, talk things over and reach an agreement.

So I suggest that in this area, the courts should take the exceptional step of abandoning their objective tests for determining whether the parties reached agreement, and if so on what terms, and should instead require that the parties reach a consensus ad idem (a meeting of minds) before they will find that there existed a contract between the parties. So the courts should stop skipping past question (1) by assuming that there was a contract between the parties, and should stop thinking that the only issue arising out of a battle of the forms is question (2) – on what terms? They need to show themselves far more willing to answer question (1) in the negative if the parties to a battle of the forms have not genuinely settled their differences. If they did that, in a few years’ time, battles of the forms would never trouble the courts again.